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Faculty and Deans

Supreme Court Report

DON'T WRITE OFF THE REAGAN
SOCIAL AGENDA
BY NEAL DEVINS
All presidents seek to further
their own social policies through litigation. Unlike other administrations,
}1owever, Reagan's presidency has met
a firestorm of criticism because its
views on such divisive issues as civil
rights, privacy and religion are a substantial departure from those of its
predecessors.
In prior Supreme' Court terms,
the administration enjoyed some success in advancing its agenda. The
Court approved administration argu~
ments that civil rights laws extend
only to actual recipients of federal
funds; that Congress intended that
discriminatory intent-not disparate
impact-be shown to establish a violation of civil rights. laws; and that
Title VII employment discrimination
remedies should extend only to actual
victims of discrimination when layoffs
are involved. The only significant setback in this area before 1986 was the
Court's holding that racially discriminatory private schools are not entitled
to tax -exempt status.
Last Term was crucial for the administration's social agenda. The
Court ruled on abortion, affirmative
action, and religion in the public
schools. At first glance, the administration's social agenda did not fare
well.
Despite the aggressive approach
of Charles Fried, who replaced Rex
Lee as solicitor general, the Court reaffirmed Roe v. Wade, validated some
types of affirmative action, and
ducked the religion-and-public school
issue. The justices rejected the administration's Baby Doe initiatives
(hospital care for handicapped newborns) and its narrow interpretation
of the 1982 Voting Rights Act.
Still, it is difficult to measure the
true success or failure of the administration's initiatives last Term. In contrast to Lee, who often sought narrow
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A Charles Fried
victories, Fried was willing to press
the administration's social agenda: arguing that affirmative action is per se
illegal and that Roe v. Wade should be
overturned.
Consequently, although administration defeats were not sweepingand on occasion the administration
scored a victory-the 1985-86 Term
was characterized as a strong rebuke
to the administration's social agenda.
Victory or defeat, therefore, tends to
be measured not by what the Court
holds, but by whether the solicitor's
efforts were fully successful. Indeed,
upon closer examination, the rulings
of this past Term may pave the way for
future administration victories.
ADMINISTRATION DEFEATS

Abortion. In Thornburgh v.
American College of Obstetricians
and Gynecologists, 106 S.Ct. 2169
(1986), the Court voted 5-4 that provisions of Pennsylvania's Abortion
Control Act were unconstitutional.
The act required physicians to inform
women considering an abortion of associated "detrimental physical and
psychological effects," and of the medical and other assistance that would
be available if the pregnancy were carried to term.
Writing for the majority, Justice
Blackmun said that "[t]he states are
not free, under the guise of protecting

maternal health or potential life, to intimidate women into continuing pregnancies."
Thornburgh is important for several reasons. First, it extends Roe by
narrowing the state's right to issue
regulations associated with the abortion decision. Second, the dissenters
were particularly harsh in their criticism of the majority..Justice White, for
example, characterized the opinion as
a "warped" and "defensive" response
to the growing recognition that "many
in this country [consider Roe] ... to
be basically illegitimate."
The solicitor's arguments before
the Court exemplify both the importance of the abortion issue to the Reagan social agenda and the differences
between Fried and Lee as solicitor
general. Rather than seek a narrow
ruling approving the Pennsylvania
statute as a nonobtrusive state effort
to advance its interest in childbirth,
the United States for the first time argued that Roe v. Wade should be overruled.
Perhaps for this reason, Justice
Stevens was especially contentious in
his concurrence, citing articles writ-

ten by then-law professor Charles
Fried that emphasized the centrality
of privacy and self-determination.
The justices' divisiveness on this
issue indicates the fragility of the
Court's abortion decisions. Roe v.
Wade had already been cemented in
three 1983 Court decisions, but only
five members of the Court supported
this decision. At the same time, considering the firmness of the Court's
opinion, Roe is not likely to be overruled or severely limited until a member of the Thornburgh majority
leaves the Court.
Baby Doe Regulations. The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) promulgated regulations
to ensure that handicapped newborns
receive adequate medical treatment.
The most controversial aspect of
these regulations required hospitals
to post notices that warn: that medical
treatment "should not be withheld
from handicapped infants solely on
the basis of their [condition]" and that
provide a confidential telephone num-
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ber for reports of suspected noncompliance. The regulations also required
state agencies to develop procedures
for the discovery and review of medical neglect of handicapped infants.
A four-member plurality of the
Court struck down this regulatory
scheme in Bowen v. American Hospital Association, 106 S.Ct. 2101
(1986).
The plurality ruled that administration authority was limited under
Section 504 of the 1973 Rehabilitation
Act, which prohibits recipients of federal financial assistance from discriminating on the basis of handicap.
While recognizing that antidiscrimination laws include handicapped newborns, the plurality ruled that Section
504 is violated only when a hospital
denies medical treatment in contravention of the parents' expressed
preference.
Moreover, noting that the solicitor failed to cite instances in which a
hospital did in fact violate Section
504, the plurality concluded that the
HHS regulatory scheme lacked a
proper evidentiary basis.
The majority also invalidated
state reporting requirements. It ruled
that rather than ensuring equal treat
ment to handicapped and nonhandicapped infants, these requirements
function as an "affirmative action" obligation that would improperly transform state agencies into "foot soldiers" in a federal campaign.
While severely limiting the administration's initiative to protect the
handicapped newborn, American
Hospital Association is a vulnerable
precedent. In addition to the three
dissenters, Chief Justice Rehnquist,
who recused himself from this case,
and Associate Justice Scalia might
well approve a variation of these regulations. In the end, therefore, Baby
Doe may be an initiative deferred, not
defeated.
Affirmative Action. The soundest defeat of the administration's social agenda was its failure to discredit
race-conscious affirmative action. The
administration had launched a major
initiative to follow up Firefighters v.
Stotts, 467 U.S. 561 (1984), in which
the justices rejected-as inconsistent
with the letter and spirit of antidiscrimination laws-court-ordered affirmative action that undercut seniority rights.
Fifty-one municipalities were no44 ABA JOURNAL I FEBRUARY 1, 1987

A Justice Harry Blackmun

tified that their hiring policieswhich grant preference on the basis of
race-were under investigation. And
regulations were drafted to limit a
1965 executive order that specifies
that government contractors are expected to hire a certain percentage of
minority employees.
After the Supreme Court ruled
that preference may be granted to
nonvictims of discrimination, the administration appears to have abandoned these efforts, at least temporarily.
In Wygant v. Jackson Board qf
Education, 106 S.Ct. 1842 (1986), the
Court sent a mixed message on the
constitutionality of affirmative action
plans. On one hand, the Court found
that the equal protection clause prohibited a school board from extending
preferential protection against layoffs
to nonsenior minority employees.
But all nine justices indicated
that a public employer may respond to
perceived discrimination by developing a "narrowly tailored" affirmative
action plan that grants preferences to
minority candidates in hiring and promotion decisions. The justices, emphasizing the desirability of voluntary
compliance, indicated that a statistical imbalance-even without a
finding of intentional discrimination
"by a court or other competent
body"-is a sufficient basis for a voluntary race-conscious remedial plan.
This ruling in effect permits public employers to use race-conscious
hiring and promotion plans if their

employee population is racially
imbalanced. At the same time, however, the remedial plans must be "narrowly tailored" to address perceived
actual discrimination, not societal discrimination.
In a little known summary order,
J.A Crosson Company v. Richmond,
106 S.Ct. 3327 (1986), the Court revealed that it was serious about its
"narrowly tailored" requirement. In
Crosson, the Court reversed the
Fourth Circuit's approval of a Richmond, Va., minority set-aside plan for
public contracts.
This plan was passed after a public hearing disclosed that despite
Richmond's substantial minority population, less than 1 percent of construction contracts were awarded to
minority-owned firms. It reserved 30
percent of each city construction contract to minority business enterprises.
The Supreme Court, other than pointing to Wygant, did not offer any explanation for its ruling.
In Local Number 93 v. Cleveland, 106 S.Ct. 3063 (1986), the Court
held that an employer (public or private) may develop an affirmative action hiring and promotion plan in
settlement of a statutorily based employment discrimination (Title VII)
lawsuit. Specifically, Local 93 validated a court-approved settlement
agreement between the city of Cleveland and an association of black and
Hispanic firefighters.
The decree provided that minority and nonminority candidates were
to be promoted on an alternating basis
to fill 66 lieutenant positions. Following these promotions, the city, using
out-of-turn promotions if necessary,
was to promote 25 percent minority
candidates to the lieutenant position.
The predominantly white firefighters union, along with the United
States, challenged the decree as inconsistent with Title VII remedial provisions which provide, in part, that no
court order shall extend relief to an
individual "if such individual was refused admission, suspended, or expelled for any reason other than discrimination on account of race, color,
religion, sex or national origin."
The Court did not decide
whether the settlement agreement
was outside the bounds of permissible
court-ordered Title VII relief. Instead
it ruled that for Title VII purposes, the
consent decree was identical to a pri-
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vate out-of-court settlement.
The Court concluded that Local
93 was indistinguishable from Steelworkers v. Weber, 442 U.S. 927
(1979), in which it held that a private
employer may voluntarily adopt a
race-conscious plan to increase minority employment. The Court flatly
rejected the solicitor's argument that
a consent decree cannot provide
greater relief than a court could decree after a trial.
While Local 93 ducked the
knotty issue of permissible Title VII
relief, the Court squarely confronted
it in Local 28 of The Sheet Metal
Workers v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 106 S.Ct.
3019 (1986).
In Sheet Metal Workers the justices, by a 4-1-4 vote, rejected the solicitor's position that Title VII relief is
limited to the actual victims of discrimination. A plurality of the Court
held that Title VII "does not prohibit a
court from ordering, in appropriate
circumstances, affirmative raceconscious relief as a remedy for past
discrimination."
Noting the union's "contemptuous racial discrimination and successive attempts to evade all efforts to
end that discrimination," the plurality
upheld the lower court's order that it
adopt a membership goal to reflect
the area's minority population (29.23
percent).
But the plurality limited the use
of such relief to instances "where an
employer or labor union has engaged
in persistent or egregious discrimination, or where necessary to dissipate
the lingering effects of pervasive discrimination."
As a whole, Wygant, Crosson,
Local 93, and Sheet Metal Workers
are not a resounding defeat of the administration's agenda. Wygant and
Crosson only recognized the propriety of "narrowly tailored" raceconscious remedial programs designed to eradicate perceived actual
discrimination, not affirmative action
programs designed to address societal
discrimination. Moreover, while racial
imbalance may serve as the basis for a
remedial plan, the Court will closely
scrutinize the appropriateness of the
plan.
Indeed, both Wygant and Crosson rejected the plans at issue. Local
93, although its consequences are farreaching, did not rule on the substan46 ABA JOURNAL I FEBRUARY 1, 1987

sexually suggestive speech before a
school assembly. The Court emphasized that the "inculcation of values is
truly the 'work of the schools'" and
that students only have limited constitutional rights.
The administration also scored a
superficial victory in Bender v. Williamsport Area School District, 106
S.Ct. 1326 (1986), a case that promised much more than it delivered.
Bender arose when a school district
refused to let a voluntary student reli.A. Carl Stotts
gious group meet on school premtive civil rights question presented, ises.
The administration strongly supbut spoke generally of judicial standards governing the entry of consent ported the student group, claiming
decrees. And the Sheet Metal Work- that permitting such meetings is
ers' plurality limited court-ordered wholly consistent with-indeed reaffirmative action relief to instances of quired by-the religion and speech
intractable, outrageous discrimina- clauses of the First Amendment. But
rather than resolve the substantive
tion.
Despite the Court's insistence on issue, the Court decided the case on
"narrowly tailored" remedies and its standing grounds.
The Court ruled that because a
general approval of victim-specific relief, these cases might prove the death school board member-not the school
knell to the administration's initia- board-appealed a district court
tives in affirmative action. This result judgment against the school system,
may be due, in part, to the fact that the district court judgment must be
Solicitor General Fried sought a preserved.
Justices Burger, Powell, Rehnknockout, rather than a victory on
points (as his predecessor Lee might quist and White dissented, claiming
have done). Consequently, instead of that the substantive issue should have
these cases being viewed as a severe been resolved in favor of the student
limitation on the use of race- group. Opinions by Justices Brennan
conscious devices, they have been and O'Connor in related cases indicharacterized as a defeat of the ad- cated that they might well side with
ministration's absolutist demand for the dissenters on the merits.
victim-specific relief.
Whether 1985-86 was a good year
for the Reagan social agenda may not
be determined for some years to
SOME VICTORIES
The administration did prevail on come. The Court is not yet prepared
some issues. In Bowers v. Hardwick, to embrace the Reagan social agenda.
106 S.Ct. 2841 (1986), the Court vali- Unless there is further change in the
dated Georgia's anti-sodomy statute, Court's personnel, the administraand narrowly viewed the right to tion's primary initiatives in school
privacy-the cornerstone of Roe v. prayer, abortion and affirmative action
Wade and decisions limiting state au- will not be fully successful.
But, perhaps more importantly
thority over an individual's sexual befor the long term, the Court's rulings
havior.
The Hardwick majority, echoing on these agenda items were far
Attorney General Meese's statements more narrow than is commonly
on judicial activism, commented that understood.
And the true measure of the ad"[T]he court is most vulnerable and
comes nearest to illegitimacy when it ministration's success should not be
deals with judge-made constitutional limited to this Term's results: Attenlaw having little or no cognizable tion must be paid to the changing
roots in the language or design of the composition of the Court. In this respect, 1985-86 could be the year of the
Constitution."
In Bethel School District No. 401 administration's greatest successv. Fraser, 106 S.Ct. 3159 (1986), the William Rehnquist has become chief
Court approved a school official's deci- justice and Antonin Scalia an assocision to suspend a student for making a ate justice. •

